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1. Introduction 
In Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition Sophia Mannmidou presents a view oflanguage 
use and cognítive and social aspects of pragmatic meaning as emerging from cognitive 
sl.rucLures and conceplualisations built on the basis of the individuals' bodilyand social 
experiences. Experiential realism (ER henceforth) is presented as a theoretical framework 
capable of tackling the nuances of meaning so conceived. Besides this general theoretical 
objective, Marmaridou tries to demonstrate that ER can also shed light OH some of the 
puzzles posed or left unresolved by what she calls the societal and the cognilive approaches 
lo pragmatics. In so doing, ER is alleged lo have the beneficial side effect ofproviding the 
necessary bridge between these two approaches. Does it evelltually manage to do so? The 
mm of this papel' is to demonstrate that it does noL But before we deal ,\'ith the bones of 
this criticism, lel us review the different parts of the book in sorne delail. 
2. Thc shortcomings and complemcntarity of cognitive and societal Ilragmatics 
In lhe firsl chaptcl', Marmaridou reviews the deficiencies ofthe cognitive al1d societal 
approaches 10 pl'agmatic meaning. The former includes a wide range of theoretical 
frameworks connected by their commitment to the idea thaí meal1ing is a mental 
phenomenon. 1 In the author's view wlüle these approaches concentrate on the kind of 
computations or inferential operations tllat are carried out in utterance production and 
1 The array oftheoríes inc1uoes Gricean pragmatics (cE Gricc (1975, 1978, 1981)), Relevance Theory (cf Spcrber 
and Wílson (1995)), or Nco-Gricean pragmatics (t:f. Horn (1988, 1989». 
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interpretation, they ignore the essential role that the content of the assumptions processed 
and the socio-cultural constraints play in this process. 2 A second problem the cognitive 
perspective faces is the erroneous idealisation concerning speaker s and hearers, who are 
assumed to share the same universal mental faculties and who are conceptually detached 
from any real social setting. A third problem concerns the concept of inference, a central 
issue in cognitive approaches to pragmatics. Marmaridou argues that the sociocultural 
aspects of the cOlmnunicative event excrt a crucial influence on the calculation of inferences. J 
In smn, the major weakness of cognitive pragmatics is, according to Marmaridou, that it 
considers cognitive and mental processing abilities as synonymous, while the latter are but 
one aspect of the fornler. 4 
The societal approach also presents a number of deficiencies that makes it 
inadequate to account for aH aspects oflanguage use. Current developments in societal 
pragmatics leave unanswered the important questions of how and why social 
constraints operate in communication. According to Marmaridou the two fundamen-
tal issues in societal pragmatics are the interactional (or "reflexive") charactcr of 
communication and the concept of context of discourse. The concept of interaction 
relies heavily on a consideration of language as a "social institution" and 
communication as a "societal work" involving power relations among the individuals 
(cf. Labov (1972), Cameron (1990), Mey (1993). Besides, being socially given, context 
is also interactively built in the course of the interaction (cf. Gumperz (1992), and 
Duranti and Goodwin (1992». To make her criticism of societal pragmatics cIear, we 
can follow Marmaridou and focus on Bang and Door's (1979) theory of utterance 
interpretation. These authors analyse utterance meaning as consisting of two parts: a 
situational and a contextual one. In Mannaridou's view, Bang and Door do not explain 
how the interpretation in the situational part is effected. That is, no cognitive 
mechanism is mentioned that can be held responsible for the internalisation, and 
thus the interpretation, of social meaning, However these cognitive mechanisms and 
processes are invoked when it comes to the analysis of how interpretations are carried 
out in the contextual partS , To sum up, societal pragmatics seems to Marmaridou to 
be unable to offer an account of the intemalisation of sociocultural meaning that goes 
beyond a vague recognition of the role of cognition in language use. 
The natural consequencc of Marmaridou's revision of cognitive and societal 
pragmatics is tbat these two broad perspectives on pragmatic meaning are somehow 
complementary, the former leaving too much of society and culture out and the larter 
missing the cognitive point almost entirely. It is in this theoretical space ibat Marmaridou' s 
work strives to carve up a place for experiential realismo 
2 This is, for example, Ihe position held by Sperber and Wilson (1995) and theirfollowers (e.g. Blakemore (1992)). 
According to relevance theorisls, lhe faet thal different individuals may inierpret Ihe same utterance in diJIerenl 
ways is due to fue difierent complltations they perform when fuey process lhe lltterance against a specific set of 
contextual assumptions. 
3 This is the viewdefendcd byWierzbicka (1991). 
4 Inthis she follows Sweetser (1990). 
The same criticism applies lo olher societal approaehes like e.g. that ofMey (1993). 
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3. Experiential realism 
The substance of ER is the embodiment -of-meal1illg hypothesis. This hypothesis has it 
that a11 fonns of meaning are the result of the neura] entrenchment of some bodily experience. 
As experiences can be physically or culturally constraincd, it follows that both physical and 
cultural c"'"Pcriences will go ínto the fonnation of meaning. The idea has achieved relative 
success i.n the field oflexical semantics, where it originated through the work ofMark JoJ:mson 
and George Lakoff (cf. Lakoff and Jolmson (1980, 1999), Lakoff (1987)). 
Thc book is very explicit, at times to the point of excessive repetition, about the 
cOl1l1ectiomst viewpoil1t on cognition. Everything meaningful must be lhe result of some 
stable, or at least occasional co-activatiol1 routlne. Repeated co-activation leads to neural 
entrenchment As usual, whatever cannot be examined under lhe miscroscope will ouly be 
cOllsídered as a possíble hypothesis. The route followed by Marmaridou is to apply ít to 
pragmatic phenomena with a double objective: to solve problems left unresolved by other 
approaches, and to lend fUMer support to the embodiment-of-meamng hypothesis. 
The remaining four chapters follow the same prograllune: a central pragmatic problem 
is taken up, the inadequacics of societal and cognitive pragmatic accounts are pointed out, 
and an approach in experientialíst terms 1S rehearsed w11ich supposedly solves the problems 
and lends support to the theory. Specifically, Marmaridou addresses four pragmatic 
phenomena which havc reccived considerable attention in the literature: deixis, 
presupposition, speech acts and implicature. Experiential realism provides her ,'",ith fue 
adequate tools to propose a particular cognitive strucÍllIe in each case, in terros oC which 
particular sociocultural understanding arise whenever these phenomena appear in language 
use. The point of departure ofMannaridou's analysis is the internal conceptualisation of 
the four phenomena in terms of idealised eognitive lllodels (ICMs) 
In the case of deixis the ICM is one of 'pointing out'. According to Marmaridou, tlle 
link between person and social deixis on the one hand, and space, time and discourse 
deixis on the other is represented by means of a number of metaphors, explained by the 
spatialization-of-form-hypothesis (cf. Lakoff 1987), and requiring a metaphorical mapping 
from a physical space onto a conceptual space. In the case of prcsuppositions, the ICM is 
built in tenns of thc ei\.1)ressions that trigger them. In order to explaín why certain uses of 
thosc triggers serve to create or cancel off presuppositions, Mannaridou argues that parts 
of the ICM are cognitively backgrounded, while others are foregrounded. In the case of 
speech acts, the ICM is socioculturally determined and presents a dual nature w11ich reflects 
utterances as a mode of speaking and as a mode of action, both domains being linked, via 
metaphorical mappings, through the concepl o[ force. According to Mannaridou, force 
can be established in two ways: by conventional means or, in their absence, in terms of 
interaction goals, negotiated \o/ithín a set of sociocultural nonns depending on the social 
roles of the interlocutors. The proposed ICMs account both for the stmcturing of a mental 
space and the prototypical structure of tlle phenomena. At the same time, the internal 
structure of the categories is analysed in terms of protot}'Pe theol)', and the relationsbip 
among more specific categories in terms of a network of conceptual metaphors. 
Observed in detail, the outcome of the process is not as positive as initially foreseen. 
Thore are two main weaknesses in the argumentation that Marmaridou puts forward against 
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current cognitíve and sodetal perspectíves and in favour of ER On the oue hand, the 
alleged theoretical benefits of the proposed approacb He more in tbe conceptllal tban in the 
empírical domain, where lhe contributioll of tbe proposed framework ís relatívely poor. 
The conceptual argumentation deployed does little more than promote the proposed analysis 
to the range of a mercly plausible conceptual alternative to existing cogtútive pragmatic 
tbeories. Tbis will hence be called the methodological i5sue. On the other hand, 
Marrnaridou's analysis disregards a number of important empirical issues tbat have long 
been part of the debate in cognitive pragmatics witbout introdncing llew ones. Tlús casts 
doubt on t11e theoretical elaboration tilat lS put forward. \Ve call this tlle empírical issue. To 
make OUT crilicism concrete and clear, we will concentrate on two of the pragmalÍc 
phenomena tbat Marmaridou addresses, presuppositions and implicalllres. 
4. The metbodological issue 
In her trea/ment of presllpposition, Mannaridou focuses on the thorny issue of 
metalingttistic negation. Basically, she agrees wifu the standard position Lhat what gets negated 
in melalinguistic negatíon is sometlúng presupposed rather than asserted by the speaker's 
utterauce. There is a long list of empírical issucs regarding tlús difficult problem. First of aU 
dIere is the ünportant problem of fue existel1ce of one or two negations. Some authors (cf 
Martín (1982), Bnrton-Robc11s (1987») defend that negation lS ambigtlOus between an interna!, 
presupposition-preservil1g reading and an external, presupposition-cancellillg reading. Sorne 
other authors (cf. AtIas (1981), Kempson (1986), Carston (1996,1998)) favour the view 1hat 
therc is but one negatio11 that can be applied to different parts or memúng layers of an utterallce. 
Second, !llere is the questioll oftI1e grammatical, semantic or pragtnatic nahrre of metalinguistic 
negation. Metalingtustic negatioll does not have an overt grammatical reflex in natural 
langtlages over thc world (í.e. is 110t expressible by affixed negatioll, does not trigger negative 
polarity, etc), is not recol1cilable with a cIear-cut distinction betweell tme and false propositions, 
and is more directIy related to the cOllcept of assertability tban lo Lhe conccpt of truth (cf. Rom 
(1985, 1989)). These ane! other problems constitute tite empírical arena on which muchofthe 
theoretical debate fu1S taken place ever since Bertrand RussclJ pointcd out the apparent ambiguity 
of sentences like the king oj'.France is not bald. Interestil1gly~ Mannaridou' s account Louches 
on these issues only as part of a revicw of the coglútive pragmatic vie\v. Her OWIl contribution 
to tI1e topie quickIy S\vitches to the lúghly conceptual field o[ the mental schemas triggeling 
and constraining tile appearance of presuppositiollS. It i5 in such a field, \Ve are infonned, that 
a principled eOl1llection betlveell the social dimension of comrmmication éUld lts cognitive 
basis can be fruit:fillly pursued. 
The basic premise is that metalinguistie llcgatioll, and presupposítion-cancelling 
generalI)', ls the result of an ICM that conceptualises power relatíons at a h1gh level of 
abstraction. Tbe participant who cancels (or else brings focus on) a presupposition is, in so 
doing, displaying and makillg recognisable a power position in the verbal interchange. 
More simply, by cal1celling or highlighting presuppositions, the spealcer takes fuII control 
of the cognitive background against which eOlllmUllÍcation tal (es place. 
The questioll arises ofw11at trivial connection tllere can be between the alleged social 
import of tbe phenomena at issue and the empi rical problerns Usted above. Mannarídou' s 
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account of presuppositiOll docs not improve in this respect. However thc point we want to 
make in this sectÍon is slightly different. Seen in a broad, methodological perspective, 
Mannaridou's applicatíon of ER to presuppositions (or to other pragmatic phenomena for 
that matter) is objectiollable on purely tbeoretical or methodological groullds: it sets liS in 
a11 empírical rcalm, and shows liS the (supposed) theoretical weaknesses of a number of 
theories which are hence allcged to be in nced of revision; however, as soon as it comes to 
the alternatíves, aH we are offered is a conceptual elaboratío11 that does 110t directly relate 
to, or at least is not hOlllogeneous with, the range alld qualily of lhe empirical problems 
raised; and neither does the proposed theory reveal new problems regardillg the chosen 
phenomena. 
Thc upshot of this revisio11 of lhe oyerall methodology of the book is that it can 
hardly qualify as a proper alternative to the theories it sets out lo improvc, símply because 
it i8 not 011 a par wíth them on purely methodological grounds. 
5. The empírical issue 
The consequenee of putting the conceptual cart before thc empírical horsc is that a 
numbel' of attested facts appear obscured, if not oyertIy questiolled 01' negated, foI' no 
jllslified reaSOIl. Obviously, thcre is nothing objectionable abaut casting doubt OH matters 
that have long been taken for gmtlted. This is a heaahy and widespread practíce in science. 
The problem comes when the revisioll is undertaken on purely conceptual grOlUlds. Tbis 
is, we believe, the case ofMarmaridou' s criticisl1l of some of lhe most important distínctions 
of cognitivc pragmatícs. One such case i5 the distinction between conventional al1d pragmatic 
meatúng. Accepting, as Marmaridou does, that the cntrenchment of a neural co-activation 
in a connectiOlúst network is the sol e source of meaning, the distillctions betweell different 
types of meaning becomc blurred. In the cognitivc paradigm convelltiollal meanÍllg i8 
more or less automaticaHy retrieved, whilc pragmatie meaning and context1m1 infoflll.t'ltion 
are the result of a reasoll-guided infcrentíal process. To show the differcllccs more elcarly, 
we wiII take up Marmaridou's account of implicatures and compare it with a standard 
cognitive account. 
Chapter 6 offers a study case of the applícatíoll of ER to implicatures, what follows 
is Marmaridou' s example and diseussioll (Marmarídou (2000: 267)). 
(l)A parclIt-daughtcr conversaban: 
DI: DidI tell yau? Fínallywe'l! be going to the diseo Ihis Saturday. 
Pl: 1 didn 't getthat. 
D2: Don't you rcmcmber thal we had agre:ed to go to a disco once? 
P2: Who's 'we'? 
D3: The girIs and me. 
P3: Ah~ 
D4: Don't tell me YOIl're not lctting me gol 
Mannaridou'g account of the recovery ofthe hnplicated assumptíon in tbis dialogue 
relies on two points: (a) the situation in which it takes place activates a certain cognitive 
scenario: 
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Significantly, the last utterance oftbe above dialogue reveals an implicit interactive 
scenario typical ofthe wider sociocultural framework in which it originates, namcly that 
pemússion must be typically sought and granted before an adolescent's cvcning outing. 
n is in terms ofthe assessment onhe situation as instantiating this institutionally groundcd 
scenario that cont1icting goals are being set and power relations are challcnged in this 
case. (Marmaridou (2000: 267)) 
(b) an inferenrial process which relies heavily on the cognitive scenarios made 
accessible by the lexical items used in the interchange: 
In the abovc dialogue, the inferences that appear to have been drawn by thc father 
upon hearing D2, as his utterance inP2 merely indicated, relate to the permission seeking 
scenario, itself involving consent and agrecment. Associated conceptual framings of 
experiencc are lcxicalised as' agrecing', whilc agents are lexicaliscd bypronoulls such as 
'we', 'you', 'who', cOllí1ict by 'not', etc. For examplc, a possiblc inference that the 
father derives from D2 is that his daughtcr wants to present the future outing as an 
already agreed upon cvent by an partied concemed and hence that his consent is not 
being sought now. Ihis inference at leas! partly arises from the experiential scenes activated 
bythe lexical frame 'agreed' and the agent pronominalization 'we': 'agree' lexicalizesa 
conceptualisation 01' experience whereby there is an issue 01' inlerest to two or more 
parties; the parties potentially hold different views or have different interests with respect 
to this issue; fue issue ofinterest may relate to future action; the issue ifinterestis negotiable, 
etc. The pronoun 'we' typically lexicalises reference to the current speaker and sorne 
other party including ar excluding the addressee. (Marmaridou (2000: 268-269)) 
What wonId be the standard cognitive account of the recovery of the implicature you 
are not really allowed lo go out? Simply to posit an inferential process at sorne point in the 
interchange. Suppose tha~ in the example at issue this point corresponds to the [ather's 
exclamation in P3 (as the girl's annoyed reply seems to suggest). (2) depicts a plausible 
inferential chain leading from P3 lO the intended messag~. 
(2) 
Al: Ihe father finds relevant the in1'ormation about who exactly is 
denoled by "we". 
A2: The father points out the relevance ofthe people involved in the 
agreement including bim. 
A3: He is not part ofthe agreement that has been made on this occasíon. 
A4: Thc agreement is not valid as it stands. 
AS: The daughter is not really allowed to go to the disco. 
This is one possible inferential routine of the type typically advocated by cognitive 
praglllatists (with differences among them pertaining to the reason why they are triggered6 ). 
In Marmaridou's proposed model the informarion that permission must be typically sought 
and granted before an adolescent's evening outing gets conventionally activated. But then the 
question is: why? Is it simply because fue conversarion is between a father and bis daughter? 
6 In Relevance Theory, fbr example, (!he principie of) relevance accounls for any inferences entertained during the 
cornmunicative process. 
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15 it because ofthe father's question about "we"? 1s it because ofthe father's exclamatioll? At 
least in the last two cases, it is hard to see how tIle relevant information can get jnto the 
communicative process unless it 1S part of an infereutial process like tbe one sketched aboye, 
Jf the former option is chosen, \Ve are foreed to admit that a number of snch scenarios, which 
are in principie indefinite, are activated evel)' time commul1icatiou is established (whích is a 
rather Ímplausible hypothesís). In arder to examine to what extent Marmaridou's cognitive 
frameworks are as part of the inrerential process as tbe premises than lieense them alld the 
consequences that they yield, let us introduce a refinement oí her own example: a mature 
daughter talks to an old father and bis pal, makes the "who are "we"?" question to her íather, 
and directs the final illteIjection to both her father and his friendo In snch a context, the 
e:x-pression could have plausibly been directed to the father' s friend to make accessible to him 
the conte:x1:ual assmnptionl cogtútive rramework tbat in that house pernússion from the daughter 
must be typically sOllght and granted before the father' s evening outing. The point 1S not onIy 
tllat this information can hardly be cognitively accessible to fue puzzled old man due to sorne 
HeuraIly elltrenclted sociocultural background, bui, most importantly, tilat it becomes cognitively 
accessible to bim (in the context at hand, for the first time in bis lile) as a result of rus trying 
to make scnse of the daughter's expression, wmch turns out to bear a somewbat prolúbiting 
attitude towards the outing. 
In relation to point (b) aboye, Mannaridou' s listing oí the cognitive scenarios activated 
by the lexical ítems contained in the different utterances in (1) is 1101 very different (or can 
be easily assirnilated) to the set of assumptions making up the cognitive-like inferentiaI 
routine described aboye. The differences come from diverging conceptual choices and herree 
ultimately depend on theoretical tastes. 
The conclusion is that, as cognitive pragrnatics holds, and contrary to her account, 
Marmaridou's proposed cOgIútive scenarios or ICMs are part of the inferential processes 
which are characteristic of ostensive cornmunication rather than automatically activated 
pieces of meaning. However, conceptually comIrÚtted as it is to the idea that there is but 
one meaning, and that it shows up through the sallle process (neural co-activation), 
Marmaridou' s analysis has little margin to tackle these simple facts, no matter how well 
attested they are from an empirica! point of view. 
6. Conclusions 
On the basis ofthe aboye review, it can be stated thatthe general objective ofMannaridou' s 
endcavour (i.e. the bridgíng between societal and cognitivepragruatics), promising and attractive 
as it may appear at fust sight, ls far from being eJIectively achieved through tllC displayed 
amt1ysis. The mmn criticism tbat can be made to fue proposed theory 15 tbat it reHes heavily 011 
conceptual arguments wlúch are at present far from being empirically testable, This ine'vitably 
leads it to (a) contributing little to tile important points of a by now longstanding empirica! 
debate, and (b) neglected sorne empirically supported notions and distinCtiOllS. 
Tlús outcome casts doUbt on Mannaridou's critica! review of socíetal and cognitive 
pragmatics, and discards ER as a suitable candidate to provide a bridge belween fuem, let 
alone to replace either oI them, It could be said that societal and cognitive pargmatics, the two 
main lines of pragmatic research to date, have not been so mist:aken in c1aiming ~at ~eir 
oq,jects of study and theír goals are too distant for there being even the prospect of a múfication. 
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